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One seldom associates childhood with violence, much less
murder, but the frightening reality is that children in American
society are increasingly both the victims and perpetrators of vio-
lent crime. One explanation of this reality is that violence is
often learned from within the family structure, and sometimes
children visit their anger upon those who taught it to them.' Par-
ricide,2 although still rare, has increased in recent years. In fact,
in 1993, parricides accounted for 306 of the 23,271 murders and
nonnegligent manslaughters reported in the United States.3 The
killing of one's abusive parent presents to the criminal justice
system the difficult dilemma of deciding whether or not such a
killing can ever be justified or excused. This Note will explore
the ramifications of expanding as well as refusing to expand
traditional self-defense frameworks to include the battered child
who kills an abusive parent and will conclude by making a policy
suggestion which allows the courts to remain true to their dual
responsibilities of providing justice to the individual as well as to
society as a whole.
Traditionally, self-defense arguments have been narrowly
limited in their scope and application,4 yet modern times have
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1. "There is a high correlation between adolescents witnessing abuse and
adolescents committing violent offenses." Gail Goodman & Mindy Rosenberg,
The Child Witness to Family Violence: Clinical and Legal Considerations, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
97, 99-102 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987).
2. Throughout this Note, "parricide" will be defined as "the act of killing
one's father or mother." The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 1413 (2d ed. 1987).
3. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 334 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1994).
4. Killing in self-defense was one of the first recognized exceptions in
English law to the rule that the taking of a life is always culpable. Cynthia
Gillespie argues that the "earliest reported cases [of self-defense] date from the
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seen the advent of innovative and unprecedented defense theo-
ries which some have dubbed "abuse excuses."5 These strategies
attempt to exculpate the actor based on his or her inclusion in a
specific category such as abused spouses or abused children.
Proponents of abuse-based defenses argue that the accused
should be allowed to present evidence of abuse and expert testi-
mony explaining the effects of that abuse in an attempt to show
that the killing was either justifiable or excusable.6 Expert testi-
mony is said to be necessary to show that the actor actually had a
reasonable belief in imminent threat of death or serious bodily
harm. If the actor proves a valid self-defense argument, then no
punishment can be justified.7
Critics of abuse-based defenses argue that abused persons
who kill their abusers do not, and should not, fit into any legally
justifiable framework of homicide defense.8 Critics contend that
expanding traditional models of self-defense to include abused
persons who kill their abusers will grossly distort the aims of self-
defense as a justification and encourage self-help rather than
resort to the criminal justice system.9
early 1200s. Although the law of self-defense has evolved over some nine
centuries, its basic parameters were established very early and have changed
remarkably little." CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 31 (1981).
5. In his most recent book, Law Professor Alan Dershowitz defines the
"abuse excuse" as "the legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim a history
of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation." ALAN M. DERSHOWrrz, THE ABUSE
EXCUSE: AND OTHER CoP-OUTs, SOB STORIES AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3
(1994).
6. See generally Gn.LsPi, supra note 4, at 159 (arguing that testimony
about Battered Woman Syndrome helps a jury understand otherwise puzzling
aspects of a defendant's actions particularly on the reasonableness of those
actions); PAUL A. MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLS: ABUSED CHILDREN WHO KILL
THEIR PARENTS 276 (1991) (explaining that expert testimony is necessary to
illustrate the effects of battering on children); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING
LoVE 267 (1989) (concluding that a qualified expert witness is the only person
able to explain the psychological reality of battered women justifies their
actions).
7. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 5.7(a)
(2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOrr].
8. In State v. Stewart, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that it was error to
give a self-defense instruction where a wife, who had suffered a long and
documented history of abuse at the hands of her spouse, shot and killed her
sleeping husband. In its decision, the court noted that it must "hold that when
a battered woman kills her sleeping spouse when there is no imminent danger,
the killing is not reasonably necessary and a self-defense instruction may not be
given. To hold otherwise .. .would in effect allow the execution of the abuser
for past or future acts and conduct." 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988).
9. The Wyoming Supreme Court refused to allow a self-defense
instruction in Jahnke v. State where a fifteen-year-old boy killed his abusive
father. The court concluded that "[t]o permit capital punishment to be
BA7TERED CHILDREN WHO KILL
With these competing concerns in mind, the criminal justice
system1" is presently challenged to categorize correctly killings of
the abuser by the abused as eitherjustified, excused, mitigated or
wholly culpable.11 This task is complicated by the fact that courts
must deal not only with the fatal act of violence by the child but
also with the often undocumented and grotesque acts of violence
which allegedly precipitated the fatal event. Against this back-
drop of complicated family ties and hidden violence,1" courts
must balance the competing concerns of the criminal justice sys-
tem. First, because the relationship between culpability and pun-
ishment is the legitimizing factor in the criminal justice system,
the charge brought against the youthful offender should accu-
rately mirror the culpability of his or her act. Typically, the
charges filed in parricide cases range from first-degree murder to
voluntary manslaughter."i A few courts have gone so far as to
allow testimony of abuse suffered by the actor at the hands of the
deceased and expert testimony regarding the effects of Battered
Child Syndrome (BCS)14 to lead to a self-defense argument and
to ultimate acquittal.15 The confusion of the courts in dealing
with the battered child who kills is further evidenced by the dis-
parity in sentencing imposed by courts of different jurisdictions
after a guilty verdict is reached in a parricide case. Some courts
show no leniency to the youthful offenders, sentencing them to
terms of imprisonment comparable to that of their adult coun-
imposed upon the subjective conclusion of the [abused] individual that prior
acts and conduct of the deceased justified the killing would amount to a leap
into the abyss of anarchy." 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984).
10. Here, the criminal justice system is understood to include police, law-
making bodies and the criminal courts.
11. This Note will focus specifically on the case of the abused child who
kills an abusive parent in a non-confrontational setting as the majority of
parricides occur in this context. See Susan C. Smith, Abused Children Who Kill
Abusive Parents, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 141, 144 n.18 (1992) (asserting that most
parricides occur in non-confrontational settings).
12. "Another characteristic of the family that accounts partially for the
high level of conflict is family privacy. Privacy insulates conflicts within the
family from both social controls and social supports that can serve to reduce or
resolve the conflict." Murray A. Strauss, Physical Violence in American Families, in
ABUSED AND BATTERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE
(Dean D. Knudsen &JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991).
13. Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Battered Child Syndrome on Issue of
Self-Defense, 22 A.L.R.5th 787 (1994).
14. In this Note, Battered Child Syndrome will refer to the cumulative
series of acts of violence or intimidation upon a child at the hands of one or
both parents.
15. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
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terparts, while other courts show considerable compassion by
ordering no jail time and hefty community service hours.1 6
In discussing whether or not courts should allow evidence of
parental abuse and expert testimony explaining the effects of
that abuse in parricide cases, this Note will look at parricide
against the backdrop of competing concerns and responsibilities
of the criminal justice system in fairly adjudicating the legal con-
sequences of any taking of human life. First, this Note will look
at the social history of both parricide and child abuse and specifi-
cally at their different evolutions. Second, it will discuss the
inability of the traditional self-defense framework to aid the bat-
tered child who kills. Next, it will examine the arguments put
forth by critics, compromisers, and proponents of expanding the
doctrine of self-defense to include the battered child who kills by
examining relevant case studies which illustrate each argument.
Fourth, this Note will examine Battered Woman Syndrome and
legislation by the state of Texas as possible foundations for
expansion and reform of traditional self-defense. Next, it will
look at disparities in sentences that those convicted of parricide
receive as further evidence of reform. Finally, this Note will con-
clude by making a policy suggestion which affords the child actor
a criminal trial which will accurately reflect the culpability of his
or her act of violence.
II. PARRICIDE & CHILD ABUSE: DIVERGENT SOCIAL HISTORIES
Historically, the killing of one's parent has perhaps been
met with more shock and horror than any other type of homi-
cide. 7 Parricide finds its earliest condemnation in religious tra-
dition. The Bible clearly and repeatedly advises that a child is to
obey and respect the parent. 8 The importance of this com-
16. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
17. Janice Schuetz, chronicler of the popular nineteenth century
parricide trial of Lizzie Borden, noted that "the fascination [with parricide]
continues even today." The twentieth century fascination with this nineteenth
century parricide is evidenced by the fact that the small town of Fall River,
Massachusetts (site of the murders), held a centennial anniversary of the crime
in the summer of 1992. JANICE SCH-ETZ, THE LOGIC OF WOMEN ON TRIAl 62
(1984). The sensationalism and public interest surrounding Erik and Lyle
Menendez, two brothers accused of murdering their parents in 1989, attests to
the continued awe with which modern society reacts to an alleged parricide. See
generaly John Johnson & Ronald L. Soble, The Menendez Brothers: Jose Menendez
Gave His Sons Everything, Maybe Even a Motive for Murder, LA. TIMES, July 22,
1990, (Magazine), at 6 (explaining the details of the crime and the arrests of
the two brothers).
18. "Honour your father and your mother so that you may live long in the
land that Yahweh your God is giving you." Exodus 20:12 (NewJerusalem Bible).
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mandment was reflected in ancient Hebrew law which excluded
parricides from any possible legal excuse:
Anyone who by violence causes a death must be put to
death. If, however, he has not planned to do it but it
comes from God by his hand, he can take refuge in a place
which I shall appoint .... Anyone who strikes father or
mother will be put to death. 19
The Code of Hammurabi, the first known codification of written
law, similarly provided harsher punishment for offenses commit-
ted against a parent by a child. Written in approximately 2250
B.C., the code provided that, "if a son strike his father, they shall
cut off his fingers."
21
Roman law similarly imposed harsher sanctions for parricide
than any other type of murder. According to Roman law, a per-
son who murdered his or her parent was to be "scourged till they
bled, sewed up in a sack with a dog, cock, viper, and ape, and
thrown into a sea or river."21 It was also not uncommon for par-
ricides to be burned alive or to be devoured by wild animals in
the amphitheater.22  One commentator noted that, "Solon
refused to make any law [punishing parricides], lest he should by
forbidding it teach the people that it was possible."
21
Although English law proscribed no greater penalty for par-
ricide than for any other type of homicide, Blackstone suggested
that it should. In his Commentaries on the Law, Blackstone
addresses the subject of parricide by first describing the punish-
ment handed down in Roman times. He then points out that
Solon had no law against parricide because he believed "it impos-
sible that any one should be guilty of so unnatural a barbarity"
and that the Persians, according to Herodotus, "adjudged all per-
sons who killed their reputed parents to be bastards."24 Black-
stone then states that the English law is lacking and suggests that
"we must account for the omission of an exemplary punishment
for this crime in our English laws, which treat it no otherwise
than as simple murder, unless the child was also the servant of his
parent. 
"25
In literature, those who have undertaken the task of stirring
the human spirit have chosen parricide as the backdrop upon
19. Exodus 21:12-16 (New Jerusalem Bible).
20. ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMuRABi 73 (1904).
21. MACYrNzrE, ROMAN LAw 402 (1876).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. THOMAS M. COOLEY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND OF SIR
WILIA BLACGSTONE 203 (1899).
25. Id.
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which to teach their most profound messages. Sophocles
penned perhaps the most famous of all literary parricides in the
tragic story of Oedipus Tyrannus. Oedipus, albeit unknowingly,
committed parricide when he killed his father Laius. Upon real-
izing the nature of his crime, Oedipus denounces himself and
asks, "Am I not by nature a villain? Am I not totally impure?"26
He later characterizes the parricide as "having killed whom it was
my duty never,"27 and himself as "the monstrous destruction, the
most accursed, and most god-detested of human kind."
28
Modem American society has similarly voiced its condemna-
tion of parricide in its punishment of the crime, admitting that
"[f] or centuries and in a number of societies the murder of one's
own parents or grandparents - parricide - has been con-
demned, and punished with more severity than other
homicides."
29
In contrast to the rarity and social condemnation of parri-
cide is the commonness and social ignorance of child abuse. His-
torically, violence within the family was just that - within the
family. Because the law has and continues today to recognize the
privilege of a parent to inflict punishment upon a child, ° there
was never a need for the common law to extend self-defense doc-
trine to the child who reacted against the privilege. In other
words, there was no defense for a child who reacted against a
beating inflicted by a parent who acted within the scope of the
privilege. Yet, the recipient of the same beating at the hands of a
stranger was the victim of a battery and entitled to respond with
like force and be protected by the law of self-defense.
As society has become more aware of the commonness of
child abuse,"1 some frightening statistics have been revealed.
Child abuse has always been considered one of the most severely
underreported crimes so that for each reported incident of
abuse, there may be several more which are undocumented.
Despite suspected underreporting, in 1992 there were an esti-
mated 2,936,000 reported instances of abuse in the United
26. THEODORE ALois BucKLEY, THE TRAGEDIES OF SOPHOCLES 30 (1871).
27. Id. at 43.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Flanagan v. State, 810 P.2d 759, 766 (Nev. 1991) (Springer, J.,
dissenting).
30. _,AFAVE & Sco-rr, supra note 7, § 5.6(a).
31. A 1993 survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics asked
Americans the question, "Compared to when you were growing up do you think
that child abuse has gotten better or worse, or remained about the same?" 75%
of those surveyed responded that they believed the incidence of child abuse
had worsened, 20% believed it remained the same and 4% thought it had
improved. BuRAu OF JusTicE STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 216.
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States.32 Even more gruesome is the number of children who die
as a result of abuse suffered at the hands of a parent.
33
Despite these statistics, society continues to react with disbe-
lief when the unthinkable, a parricide, occurs. The truth of this
assertion was illustrated over' a century ago when Lizzie Borden
was tried for the murders of her parents Andrew and Abbey. Liz-
zie, a thirty-two-year-old college educated woman, lived with her
sixty-four-year-old mother and seventy-two-year-old father in Fall
River, a small city in southeastern Massachusetts.3 4 The grue-
some axe murders of Lizzie's prominent parents drew national
attention. Despite strong physical evidence linking Lizzie to the
murders and an inheritance of half-a-million dollars due to Lizzie
upon the death of both of her parents, the jury found her not
guilty.35 Her only conviction comes in the form of the play-
ground rhyme which immortalizes the event:
Lizzie Borden took an axe
And gave her mother forty whacks;
When she saw what she had done,
She gave her father forty-one.
36
It is against this backdrop of historic parental privilege and
traditional abhorrence of parricide that the slow acceptance of
Battered Child Syndrome as a defense to homicide must be con-
sidered. Only with an understanding of the many factors against
which such a defense runs counter can one comprehend the
struggle of achieving both social and judicial acceptance of a
defense for the battered child who kills.
III. MORAL CULPABILITY, THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE & THE
BATTERED CHILD
A just government rests on the consent of the governed. 7
Thanks to a useful fiction, each person is assumed to assent to be
governed by the laws of his society with the expectation that
32. NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION RESEARCH, CURRENT
TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES 4 (1993).
33. The National Center on Child Abuse Prevention Research reported
that there were 1,176 confirmed child abuse and neglect related fatalities in
1991. Id, at 15.
34. SCHUETZ, supra note 17, at 61-62.
35. Id. at 62.
36. M.JEANNE PETERSEN ET AL., LIZZIE BORDEN: A CASE BOOK at vii (1980).
37. The Declaration of Independence provides that, "governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it." VIRGINIA COMMISSION
ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE AMERICAN BEGINNINGS 9 (1961).
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others will abide by the same laws and that those who do not will
be punished.38 A further legitimizing feature ofjust government
is that .only those who are deserving of punishment will be pun-
ished. Punishment is imposed upon only those who are culpable
for their acts, and that punishment is imposed to a degree com-
mensurate with that culpability.
39
Shrouded for years behind the heavy veils of family silence
and social ignorance, the battered child is slowly emerging as
one who presents a serious dilemma to the criminal justice sys-
tem. The case of the battered child who kills an abusive parent
comes before the court in the enigmatic form of a violent mur-
derer hidden beneath a facade of youth and innocence. As
stated above, the law has not contemplated a specific defense
which would excuse a child who murders an abusive parent.' In
fact, traditional self-defense theories presuppose that two adult
males are involved in the conflict.4 ' Self-defense theories have
38. Locke postulates that "Man being born, as has been proved, with a
title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all of the rights and
privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men
in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is,
his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to
judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others .... Bui, because no
political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to
preserve the property, and ... punish the offenses of all those of that society."
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 46 (1980).
39. In his article, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, Peter Arenella notes the difference
between mala in se and mala prohibita offenses. "Mala in se crimes refer to
conduct that is inherently wrong: behavior that breaches community moral
norms independent of its illegality. Legal commentators distinguish between
these mala in se offenses (e.g., murder, rape, arson, larceny, and assault) and
public welfare offenses that proscribe mala prohibita behavior: acts or
ommissions that are wrong only because they have been proscribed by law to
promote our social welfare. Unlike mala in se crimes that require proof of the
offender's moral culpability, public welfare crimes usually do not require proof
that the offender deserves to be punished for his transgression." 39 UCLA L.
Rxv. 1511, 1513 n.3 (1992).
40. George Fletcher explains the difference between self-defense as a
justification and an excuse by stating that "claims of justification concede that
the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge whether the act is
wrongful; claims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid
the attribution of the act to the actor." GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAw 759 (1978).
41. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted that "the traditional concept of
self-defense has posited one-time conflicts between persons of somewhat equal
size and strength. When the defendant is a victim of long-term domestic
violence, such as a battered spouse, such traditional concepts may not apply."
State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988). The Washington Supreme
Court also acknowledged this discrepancy in the law and ruled that it was error
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been slow to expand beyond this implicit scenario to embrace
the realities of family violence.
Although self-defense was "one of the first exceptions to the
Anglo-Saxon idea that the taking of a life is culpable regardless of
the circumstances," its "basic parameters were established very
early and have changed remarkably little."4 2 One reason that
self-defense theories have been slow to expand is that life is the
most highly venerated and protected right in society." As a
result, legally justifiable homicides have been carefully limited to
instances of self-defense," defense of another,45 defense of one's
own habitation,' capital punishment,47 killing in war,48 and
some killings by police.49 These exceptions have been narrowly
carved out in an attempt to protect the sanctity of human life and
discourage self-help and personal vengeance.
Abuse-based defenses such as Battered Child Syndrome chal-
lenge this system of personal responsibility by seeking to shift
responsibility for a criminal act from the individual to an event
or aspect of his or her environment. This shift requires the law
to abandon its credo that "the punishment should fit the crime"
and accept the belief that "the punishment should fit the crimi-
to give the standard self-defense instruction in the case of a woman who killed a
male aggressor because it left "the jury with the impression that the objective
standard to be applied is that applicable to an altercation between two men."
State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977). The court feared that the
standard instruction might violate the defendant's right to equal protection of
the law and stated that the woman "was entitled to have the jury consider her
actions in light of her own perceptions of the situation, including those
perceptions which were the product of our country's 'long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination.' Until such time as the effects of that history are
eradicated, care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions
afford women the right to have their conduct judged in light of the individual
handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination." Id.
42. GILESPIE, supra note 4, at 31.
43. Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence that "all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness;
that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men." VIRGINIA
COMMISSION ON CONSTrrTIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 38, at 9. "The right
to life and personal security is not only sacred.., it is inalienable." 40 AM.JUR.
2n Homicide § 111 (1968 & 1994 Supp.).
44. LAFA E & ScoTr, supra note 7, § 5.7.
45. Id. § 5.8.
46. Id. § 5.9(b).
47. Id. § 5.5(a).
48. Id. § 5.5(c).
49. Id. § 5.10.
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nal."5 ' These attempts to shift responsibility have been met with
judicial skepticism and social suspicion, yet they present legiti-
mate challenges to the law's responsibility to punish only those
who are culpable for their acts and only to the extent of their
culpability. The challenge for the criminal justice system is to
promulgate rules and standards that protect individual rights by
promoting personal responsibility while still providing the
abused child who kills a fair trial that properly assesses his or her
culpability.
IV. TRADITIONAL SELF-DEFENSE THEORIES APPLIED TO THE
BATrERED CHILD WHO KILLS
Traditionally, self-defense has been available as an affirma-
tive defense when one who is not the aggressor in an encounter
uses:
[A] reasonable amount of force against his adversary when
he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger
of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that
the use of such force is necessary to avoid the danger.51
Given this definition, a case of perfect self-defense would
involve an aggressor threatening serious bodily harm or death to
his victim and an intended victim's use of force reasonably neces-
sary to avoid the harm. Justice Holmes put forth the classic
expression of self-defense in Brown v. United States.52 In Brown,
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for shoot-
ing an aggressor who was assaulting him with a knife at the time
of the fatal shooting. In overturning the conviction, Justice
Holmes explained:
In order to excuse or to justify the taking of a human life, it
must appear that the killing was reasonably necessary to
protect other interests which for good reasons the law
regards as more important, under all of the circumstances,
than the continued existence of the life in question .... In
so far as self-defense is concerned, the normal case of
50. Again, one must consider that in some cases, such as certain battered
children, the defendant is not a criminal, and therefore no punishment is
proper. Arenella accurately describes the tension between deciding whether or
not punishment is deserved when he posits, "[some view moral blame as
deserved even when the actor's breach of morality can be attributed to factors
beyond his meaningful control. In contrast to such visions, the liberal
paradigm requires actors to have some form of knowledge, reason, and control
of their actions before they can be fairly blamed for what they have done."
Arenella, supra note 40, at 1517.
51. LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 7, § 5.7(a).
52. 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
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another interest is the life of a person other than the one
killed. If the protection of that life makes necessary the
homicide in question, there can be no doubt that the law
must excuse or justify the killing.
53
Justice Holmes commented on the issue of reasonableness by
advising that "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the
presence of an uplifted knife .... It is not a condition of immu-
nity that one in that situation should pause to consider whether a
reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to
disable his assailant rather than not kill him."'
Based on Justice Holmes' explanation of self-defense, the
actor must have reasonably believed that he was in imminent
danger.5 5 Based on typical facts, it is clear why battered children
who kill their abusive parents in non-confrontational settings do
not fit within the framework of traditional self-defense. The dan-
ger posed to the child at the moment of the killing will often
appear to be neither imminent nor reasonable to the average
person; but to the child involved in a long and continued cycle of
abuse at the hands of a parent, the constant and ongoing threat
of abuse may make the child believe that the killing of his or her
parent is indeed necessary to ward off imminent death or great
bodily harm.5 6
A. Reasonable Belief as a Requisite to a Self-Defense Instruction
The battered child lives in a world which is strikingly differ-
ent from his or her non-abused counterparts. As a result, the
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id. at 343.
55. For purposes of this Note, "imminent" will be understood to
encompass both "imminent" and "immediate." Although the words arguably
have different legal significance with regard to temporal proximity of danger,
"[n]o significant difference exists between imminent and immediate
jurisdictions in the rate of complaints on appeal that the trial judge refused to
give any instruction on the question of self-defense." Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 379, 414 n.121 (1991). The difference between imminent and
immediate is a choice "between a requirement that the jury focus on the
circumstances, including past events, surrounding the defendant's action, and a
requirement that the focus be limited to the particular instant of the
defendant's action." Id. at 414.
56. In the analogous family abuse situation of the battered wife, studies
suggest that an abused individual becomes familiar with nuances in the abuser's
behavior which will signal a beating. "Subtle motions or threats that might not
signify danger to an outsider or to the trier of fact acquire added meaning for a
battered woman whose survival depends on an intimate knowledge of her
assailant." Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the
Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 634 (1980).
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child's perceptions of normal family relationships become
skewed. With specific regard to the self-defense strategy, the
child's perception of "reasonable belief" is formed in response to
years of oppressive and violent abuse. Traditional self-defense
theories fail to take into account the years of abuse. By looking
at only the homicidal event and it alone, the court denies the
battered child who kills in a non-confrontational setting the
opportunity to explain the. reasonableness of the act. In many
situations, the abused child has picked up on a signal or subtlety
in the abuser's behavior that threatens a beating. In the analo-
gous familial abuse situation of the battered woman, it has been
observed that the abused "may reasonably believe that their lives
are at risk because of changes in style of assault, or because the
abuser says something that, in the past, has signalled great dan-
ger."57 The failure of social service agencies to intervene and the
unwillingness of family members to report the abuse also contrib-
ute to the abused person's reasonable belief that his or her life is
in danger. 58
Given the frequent absence of an outward act that causes
reasonable belief in imminent harm, Battered Child Syndrome,
as a defense, requires that the law accept an alternative form of
"reasonableness" founded in the subjective beliefs and fears of
the abused child, including past abuse at the hands of the
deceased.
B. Imminent Danger as a Requisite to a Self-Defense Instruction
Because history of abuse and threat of violence are often the
precipitating causes of the killing rather than one specific act of
57. Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the
Representation of Battered Women Who Kil, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 227, 230
(1986).
58. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989), the United States Supreme Court affirmed a Seventh Circuit
decision holding that the Department of Social Services' failure to remove a
child from the custody of an abusive father did not violate the child's rights
under the substantive component of the Due Process clause. In that case,
Randy DeShaney was awarded custody of his one-year-old son, Joshua, in 1980.
During the next four years, the local emergency room reported several
incidents of suspected child abuse against Joshua to the county department of
social services. Although the incidents were recorded, the department allowed
Joshua's father to retain custody. In 1984, Randy DeShaney beat his four-year-
old son so severely that he fell into a coma and sustained permanent brain
damage. Id. at 193. Despite the almost constant abuse throughout the four
years Joshua lived with his father, none of the family members reported it.
DeShaney's second wife did not report the abuse until she initiated divorce
proceedings in January 1982. DeShaney's live-in girlfriend did not report any
incidents of abuse during her entire stay in the DeShaney home.
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violence, "imminent" and "immediate"59 do not apply to battered
children who kill in non-confrontational settings. Traditional
self-defense theories presuppose an outwardly violent act against
which the person claiming self-defense is acting at the moment
of the killing. In fact, traditional self-defense demands an out-
ward act.60
Many of the same reasons that explain the "reasonableness"
of the battered child's perceptions explain the child's belief in
"imminence" of harm. Again, the battered child believes that a
beating is imminent because something in the abuser's actions or
words has signalled a beating in the past. In other cases, the reg-
ularity and frequency of the attacks over a continued and sus-
tained period of years has led the child to conclude that the
beatings will continue with the same certainty. In either case, the
battered child needs to present testimony explaining what events
formed his or her perception of "imminence" in order to mount
a successful self-defense claim.
C. Expert Testimony Is Necessary to Prove a Battered Child's Self-
Defense Argument
At trial, the battered child needs the aid of expert testimony
to show that past abuse and the threat of future abuse caused
him or her to form a "reasonable belief" of "imminent harm" at
the moment of the killing. Because the mental state of an
abused child is significantly different from his or her non-abused
counterparts, a jury will likely need expert testimony to explain
the differences between their own experiences and the experi-
ence of an abused child.
61
59. Manyjurisdictions use the word "immediate" rather than "imminent"
in their respective laws. This Note will criticize both terms as inappropriate and
too narrow to embrace the battered child.
60. Blackman, supra note 58, at 230 (asserting that" 'classic' self-defensive
action is embodied in male stranger-to-stranger assault").
61. "In situations where there is a lack of empathic care and experience
of abuse and neglect, the symbiotic phase is highly distorted. Care is oriented
much more toward the whims and convenience of caretakers, with less
appropriate response to the child. In this situation, it is impossible for the child
to develop any sense that the world or the people in it in any way reliably
respond to his own needs. Hence, he cannot develop basic trust, but, on the
other hand, will view the world with some degree of doubt and suspicion .... It
is not surprising, therefore, that as a result of these experiences in childhood,
we see adults who are somewhat socially isolated and have a great deal of
difficulty in reaching out to others for help and assistance. They have no basic
trust and have some fear that the very people to whom they will look for help
will be the ones most likely to attack. They also feel their own deepest needs
have never been and never will be fully satisfied. There is a low sense of self-
esteem and some degree of chronic, low-grade, depressive feeling." Brandt
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Dr. Ray E. Heifer explains the perceptions of a battered
child by asking one to
consider what happens when touching hurts, most of the
time, smells about the house bring on very negative feel-
ings, most of the time, mom's eyes show the threat of a swat;
when the child listens to mom and dad talk, he becomes
afraid, once the messages he hears are threats, screams,
and anger. Over and over, day after day, the child is bom-
barded with negative sensory messages, messages that truly
force the senses to 'shut down.' The child learns that it is
far safer not to listen, not to look, and not to be touched,
for when these senses are used, he hurts much more often
than he feels good.62
As a result of this type of abuse, the "child's senses become
'muted,' and used only when absolutely necessary." 63 Not only is
communication more difficult for abused children, it may seem
to them to be futile because children "reared in abuse have had
their senses trained in such a way that to use them for receiving
or transmitting positive messages is not part of their communica-
tion systems. " '
Holmes' famous statement that "detached reflection cannot
be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife" illustrates the
Court's traditional approach to the reasonableness standard.65
What courts have failed to acknowledge is that, to a battered
child, a low tone or a subtle glance may be the equivalent of an
uplifted knife; this reality is what the outside juror does not, and
cannot, know without the aid of expert testimony.
Because most courts have not acknowledged the theory
behind abuse-based defenses - that is, that both reasonableness
and imminence of great bodily harm may be formed and evoked
in response to a history of abuse - courts have not allowed both
expert testimony and a self-defense instruction where there is no
objective evidence of imminence of harm. The Kansas Supreme
Court decision in State v. Stewart illustrates the futility of admit-
ting expert testimony on the effects of abuse but then stopping
short of allowing such testimony to support a self-defense instruc-
tion. In Stewart, the trial court heard evidence of abuse and the
Steele, Psychodynamic Factors in Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 57 (C.
Henry Kempe & Ray E. Heifer eds., 1980).
62. Ray E. Heifer, Developmental Deficits Which Limit Interpersonal Skills, in
THE BATTERED CHILD 38 (C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Heifer eds., 1980).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
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psychologist's expert opinion that the defendant was suffering
from Battered Woman Syndrome or post-traumatic stress syn-
drome at the time of the killing and gave a self-defense instruc-
tion to the jury.66 On appeal, after an acquittal, the Supreme
Court stated that "[i]n order to instruct a jury on self-defense,
there must be some showing of an imminent threat or a con-
frontational circumstance involving an overt act by an aggressor.
There is no exception to this requirement where the defendant
has suffered long-term domestic abuse and the victim is the
abuser."67
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court's self-
defense instruction was improperly given where there was no
objective evidence showing reasonable belief in imminent dan-
ger of death or serious bodily injury.8 Specifically, the court dis-
approved of the trial court's self-defense instruction, which
provided:
Where the battered woman syndrome is an issue in the
case, the standard for reasonableness concerning an
accused's belief in asserting self-defense is not an objective,
but a subjective standard. The jury must determine, from
the viewpoint of defendant's mental state, whether defend-
ant's belief in the need to defend herself was reasonable.
6 9
In finding error in the trial court's self-defense instruction, the
Supreme Court upheld the admission of expert testimony on the
issue of reasonableness but refused to allow that evidence to lead
to a self-defense instruction. In doing so, the Kansas Supreme
Court acknowledged the fact that expert testimony is instrumen-
tal in showing "reasonableness" and "imminence" of the battered
person's perceptions yet severely limited the effectiveness of its
admission by not allowing it to lead to a self-defense instruction.
Because a child is often reacting to familiar signals of abuse
rather than to blatant acts of hostility, a child's violent response
may seem unwarranted and unreasonable to the outside
observer.70 In fact, to the supposedly reasonable juror, the act
may seem to be nothing other than premeditated murder. For
these reasons, traditional notions of self-defense do not afford
many battered children an adequate defense.
66. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 574-76 (Kan. 1988).
67. Id. at 577.
68. Id. at 579.
69. Id.
70. Children of abuse become able to detect subtleties in abuser's
behavior which act as signals that abuse is imminent or possible. See Shelley
Post, Adolescent Parricide in Abusive Families, 61 CHILD WELFARE 445 (1982).
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Only through an expert's explanation to the jury of the
effects of abuse on the mind of the actor can the jury be edu-
cated in. a way which will allow them to evaluate fairly the
accused's culpability. Because "the perceptions and responses of
a battered person can be understood only within the context of
[his or] her unique situation," the battered person must be
allowed to testify to past abuse, and the expert must be allowed to
explain the effects of that abuse at the time of the killing.7" Ulti-
mately, the decision of guilt or innocence remains with the trier
of fact. The use of expert testimony simply bridges an otherwise
insurmountable gap in experience which effectively precludes
any appeal to a self-defense argument by battered persons who
kill in non-confrontational settings.
V. THE STATUS Quo, COMPROMISE & CHANGE: WHIPPLA,
JA, & JA NS
In response to abuse-based defenses has come a wealth of
academic and judicial responses which decry, modify and sup-
port their implementation.
A. The Status Quo: Whipple - Excluding Battered Children from the
Self-Defense Argument
1. The Case
The Indiana Supreme Court decision in Whipple v. State72
illustrates the denial of a self-defense instruction to a battered
child because of strict adherence to traditional definitions of
"imminent" and "necessity." In Whipple, seventeen-year-old Dale
and his younger sister agreed that they would kill their abusive
parents. For the entirety of his life, Dale suffered abuse at the
hands of both parents and was beaten for things such as having
candy bars in his bedroom.7" On the evening of January 1, 1985,
Dale asked his mother to accompany him to the garage and,
once there, he struck her with an ax several times in the back of
the head. Dale then proceeded to his parents' bedroom where
he killed his father with the same ax.
At trial, Dale sought to introduce testimony relating the
years of abuse he had endured at the hands of both parents in an
attempt to prove a self-defense theory premised on the conten-
tion that he lived in "an ongoing atmosphere of imminent dan-
71. JoElle Anne Moreno, Killing Daddy, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1281, 1290
(1989).
72. 523 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1988).
73. Id. at 1365.
BATERED CHILDREN WHO KILL
ger of serious bodily harm and fear of death."74 Although the
trial court allowed the jury to hear evidence of abuse, it rejected
Dale's request for a self-defense instruction based on his failure
to show "imminence" of harm. The Indiana Supreme Court
stated that even "assuming, arguendo, that defendant honestly
and in good faith believed the killings were necessary to prevent
subsequent serious bodily injury from imminent use of unlawful
force, we nevertheless find untenable the contention such sub-
jective perceptions were objectively reasonable."75 In fact, the
Indiana Supreme Court denied that this type of killing in a non-
confrontational setting could ever be justified as self-defense
pointing out that:
[T] he absence of imminent or impending danger ... as
evidenced by the remoteness in time between the murder
of the victims and the last physical abuse inflicted upon
either defendant or his sister, and by the fact the father was
asleep and the mother was in a non-threatening disposi-
tion on the night of the killings, precludes the successful
assertion of the defense of self or defense of others as a
matter of law.76
The Indiana Supreme Court opted to adhere to the traditional
definition of self-defense and to fit the victims of domestic abuse
within its strictures. The court addressed the issue of abuse
stating:
We are cognizant of the tragedy experienced by the victims
of battering relationships and all too frequent failure of
social and law enforcement institutions to provide timely
aid, comfort, and assistance to such victims. However, we
are inescapably confronted here with conduct constituting
the statutory offense of murder. The crimes cannot be
condoned or excused .. .
As a result of strict adherence to the definition of "imminence,"
Dale was found guilty but mentally ill of both murders and sen-
tenced to concurrent sentences of thirty and forty years
imprisonment.
2. Whipp/e Critical Response
Professor Alan Dershowitz has echoed the sentiments of the
Indiana Supreme Court in Whipple by enumerating the dangers
74. Id. at 1366.
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of what he has termed the "abuse excuse.""8 In his book, The
Abuse Excuse: And Other Cop-ots, Sob Stoies, and Evasions of Respon-
sibility, Dershowitz includes Battered Child Syndrome in a double
digit list of defenses79 which place "the victim - who is usually
dead and incapable of defending himself - on trial" ° which will
lead to "invitation[s] to lawlessness."8 l
Dershowitz cites the case of Lyle and Erik Menendez to dis-
credit the validity of the battered child defense in parricide cases.
Dubbing it the "paradigm of the abusive and successful employ-
ment of the abuse excuse,"82 Dershowitz decries the eighteen
and twenty-one-year-old Menendez brothers who killed their par-
ents in their Beverly Hills mansion on August 20, 1989 in a seem-
ingly premeditated fashion as "'preventive' execution[er]s."
s8
Despite evidence that the brothers planned the murders and had
several means of escape available to them, the trial resulted in a
hung jury after testimony that they had been sexually abused by
their parents.84 Dershowitz asserts that outcomes such as this
"endanger our collective safety by legitimating a sense of vigilan-
tism that reflects our frustration over the apparent inability of
law enforcement to reduce the rampant violence that engulfs
US. "85
Other critics fear that so-called abuse excuses will weaken
notions of personal responsibility, increase lawlessness by institut-
ing vigilantism and lessen the effectiveness of legitimate defenses
in appropriate cases.8 6 Others fear that such defenses will pro-
tect the individual only by sacrificing the whole so that "individ-
ual freedoms [will] outweigh the welfare of society. "87
78. Dershowitz defines the "abuse excuse" as "the legal tactic by which
criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent
retaliation." DERSHOWlTZ, supra note 5, at 3.
79. The defenses which Dershowitz include in his book range from
"Black Rage" and "Adopted Child" Syndromes to "Chronic Lateness" and
"Football Widow" Syndromes. Id. at 321-41.
80. Id. at 19.
81. Id. at 42.
82. Id. at 21.
83. Id. at 24.
84. It is important to note that the judge in the Menendez trials did not
instruct the jury on self-defense. Given the ages of the defendants and the
means of escape available to them, the judge only instructed the jury on
imperfect self-defense, which requires "an unreasonable belief that their lives
were in imminent danger." Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 4.
86. James H. Andrews, I May be a Murderer, But It's Not My Fault, THE
CHRISTAN ScI. MONrrOR, Sept. 19, 1994, at 13.
87. Scott Montgomery, Call us... Irresponsible: It has Gone from 'The Buck
Stops Here' to the Menendez Brothers, EVERYDAY MAG., Dec. 26, 1994, at 6E.
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The frustration of these critics can be understood in a case
such as Menendez, where the physical evidence of a homicide as
well as the voluntary confessions of the killers are presented and
a hung jury results. Such an outcome goes directly against the
sanctity of human life in civilized society so that the rage and
disgust evoked by a hung jury is easily understood. While in
many respects the Menendez case may be considered an aberra-
tion, it is not the existence of the defense which caused the injus-
tice, rather it is the jury's application of it. In fact, abuse-based
defenses seek to present all of the relevant information to the
jury so that reasonableness and imminence may be properly
determined. These defenses do not exculpate an entire class of
murderers simply because they were abused by their victims, nor
do they give abused persons a free "license to kill and maim""8 as
Dershowitz would have one believe. But because, as the Menen-
dez case illustrates, juries can abandon the dictates of the law and
embrace the emotion of a case, laws entitling a defendant to a
self-defense instruction must be carefully defined in order to
afford the abused person a fair trial and also to remain true to
the policy goals behind the self-defense justification.
B. Compromise: Jahnke - Manslaughter as an Inadequate Response
1. The Case
On November 16, 1982, sixteen-year-old Richard Jahnke
used a shotgun to shoot and kill his father as he entered the fam-
ily home."9 Earlier that day, Richard had engaged in a violent
altercation with his father who regularly beat him, his mother,
and sister. The trial court allowed Richard to present evidence
documenting a long history of abuse at the hands of his father
and instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense but refused to
admit evidence on the issue of "reasonableness." The court con-
ceded that although "our reading of the record leaves us skepti-
cal with respect to the validity of the defense of self-defense
under these circumstances, [ ] the testimony of the appellant
that he acted in self-defense is sufficient to justify the instruc-
tion."" But, the trial court's self-defense instruction became
almost meaningless when the court refused to allow the defend-
ant to present expert testimony regarding the defendant's rea-
sonable belief in imminent harm. The supreme court
concluded:
88. DERSHiOWITZ, supra note 5, at 3.
89. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 991 (Wyo. 1984).
90. Id. at 1002.
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Absent a showing of the circumstances involving an actual
or threatened assault by the deceased upon the appellant,
the reasonableness of the appellant's conduct at the time
was not an issue in the case, and the trial court at the time
it made its ruling, properly excluded the hearsay testimony
sought to be elicited from the forensic psychiatrist.9 1
As a result, Richard was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
and sentenced to five to fifteen years imprisonment. The rulings
and sentence of the trial court were upheld by the Wyoming
Supreme Court. The effect of the court's ruling was to forbid
Jahnke from presenting evidence of his violent history with his
father in order to show the reasonableness of his fear of immi-
nent death or bodily harm - evidence which is needed to mount
an effective self-defense argument.9 2
A careful comparison of the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Jahnke illustrates the competing concerns that face courts
dealing with parricide cases; it also illustrates judicial approaches
to dealing with the evidence. In arriving at the conclusion that
evidence of past abuse could not be presented in order to prove
the traditional requirements of self-defense, Justice Thomas, writ-
ing for the majority, assumes the cautious legal high ground.
Beginning with the premise that life is the law's most highly pro-
tected interest, Justice Thomas proceeds by first distinguishing
the battered child defense from traditional theories of self-
defense and, second, by warning of the innumerable debilitating
consequences which would assuredly result if the self-defense
exception were expanded to include abuse-based defenses such
as battered child syndrome.
Justice Thomas describes the differences between Richard
Jahnke's battered child defense and traditional self-defense as
"patent."9" In distinguishing the two defenses, Justice Thomas
first points out that self-defense arises in response to an "immi-
91. Id. at 1007.
92. The Wyoming Supreme Court refused to allow a self-defense
instruction because there was no imminence of harm to the defendant where
the defendant was waiting for his victim to return home. Other courts have
read the imminence requirement more broadly in cases of domestic abuse. In
State v. Norman, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that it was reversible
error to fail to instruct on self-defense where the defendant shot her sleeping
husband after a long history of abuse and repeated incidents of abuse on the
day of the fatal shooting. In its discussion of imminence, the court found that
although the victim's list abusive act towards his wife was not concurrent with
the defendant's fatal act, the victim's nap was "but a momentary hiatus in a
continuous reign of terror." 366 S.E.2d 586, 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd,
378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
93. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 996.
BATTERED CHILDREN WHO KILL
nent" danger while Jahnke's response amounted to a calculated
attack as evidenced by the fact that he concealed weapons
throughout the family home, armed his younger sister, and lay in
wait for his father's return.
Justice Thomas next demands that self-defense be applied
only in "circumstances involving a confrontation."94 By pointing
to the requirement that, at the time the defendant kills his
abuser, there be an "overt act or acts by the deceased, which
would induce a reasonable person to fear that his life was in dan-
ger,"95 Justice Thomas emphasizes that at the time of the attack,
Jahnke's father did nothing more than attempt to enter his
home. The majority likens Jahnke's acts to premeditation more
than self-defense. Justice Thomas' initial discussion of the differ-
ences between the two defenses namely, traditional self-defense
and Battered Child Syndrome self-defense, places Jahnke's argu-
ment clearly outside the realm of traditional self-defense.
Justice Thomas continues by warning of the inevitable dan-
gers of adopting Battered Child Syndrome as a justification for
the taking of a human life, positing that ifjudicial recognition of
an abuse-based defense were given, there is reason to fear that
the number of individuals seeking to justify their murderous
actions upon similar lines would increase exponentially. The
court avoids this feared outcome by refusing to admit the expert
forensic psychiatrist's testimony because it had not "been
presented any evidence of any court's acceptance of the science
of the battered child, [and of] what can be predicted from the
battered child."96
In affirming the trial court's decision to exclude the testi-
mony of the forensic psychiatrist, Justice Thomas looks to the
importance of the reasonable person standard and its foundation
in a shared common experience. He states that although many
"seem to be prepared to espouse the notion that a victim of
abuse is entitled to kill the abuser, that special justification
defense is antithetical to the mores of modern civilized society."
9 7
Implicit in this statement is the notion that ifjuries acquit victims
who kill their abusers, juries are betraying their duty to society.
By relieving the actor of culpability, the jury allows the actor to
assume the role of both judge and jury. The actor circumvents
the entire rule of law by being able to decide what amount of
abuse must be endured before he or she is allowed to exact fatal
94. Id. at 997.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1004.
97. Id. at 997.
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retribution from the abuser. This is what leads Justice Thomas to
conclude that expansion of the self-defense justification would
"amount to a leap into the abyss of anarchy."98
This is where the majority and the dissent most significantly
depart in their philosophies. The majority professes a belief in a
law based in common experience as a means of ensuring fairness
to all. Conversely, Justice Rose writing for the dissent insists that
members of the jury must be informed of conditions existing
beyond the ken of their common experience because the abused
has been treated in such a way as to take him or her outside of
the realm of that common experience. 99 Because of this shift
from the shared common experience of the majority into the
realm of the unshared individual experience of the abused, the
dissent argues that the jury is in need of special instruction on
the mental state of an abused person.1"' This shift is necessary in
order to ensure the abused a fair trial that could not otherwise be
obtained if he or she were judged by the standards of a world in
which abuse is not the norm or has never been experienced.10 1
In contrast to the legal rigidity of Justice Thomas' majority
opinion, Justice Rose embarks upon an impassioned dissent by
describing the deceased as a "cruel, ill-tempered, insensitive man
[who] roams, gun in hand, through his years of family life as a
98. Id.
99. Justice Rose asks, "how could this young boy structure an
understandable defense when-even though the record discloses that since age
two he had been bullied, battered, frightened and emotionally traumatized-
he was, nevertheless, denied the opportunity to have explained to his jury
how abused people reasonably handle their fears and anxieties-what their
apprehensions are-how, in the dark moments of their aloneness, they
perceive the imminence of danger-and how, in response, they undertake to
assert their right of self-defense?" Id. at 1012 (Rose, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Rose argues that, "sfnce the issue of self-defense in the
unusual behavioral circumstances of this case is a subject which is cloaked in
the abstract mysteries of professional knowledge, the jury, deprived of an
expert's explanation of how battered people perceive and respond to
imminence of danger, could not be expected to and did not understand and
quantify the impact and residuals of the years and years of battering which had
been the lifelong fate of Richard Jahnke." Id. at 1012.
101. Justice Rose concludes that, "[dienied this opportunity [to present
expert testimony], the appellant was forced to submit his case to the jury with
what consequently present itself as a ridiculous, unbelievable, outrageous
defense .... How could any jury be receptive to such a defense on an informed
basis if its members are not to be permitted to hear from those who understand
how brutalized people-otherwise 'reasonable' in all respects-entertain what,
for them, is a belief that they are in imminent danger from which there is no
escape and how they, with their embattled psyche, responsively behave?" Id. at
1013.
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battering bully."1 ° 2 This description sets the stage for a fiery
opinion written in an attempt to illustrate just how ill-equipped a
jury without the aid of expert testimony is to deal with the issue
of reasonableness in situations of abuse. Justice Rose notes that
for RichardJahnke between "the ages of four and 12, there was
seldom a day without some sort of punishment by his father ....
He would be beaten for such things as not cleaning the basement
the right way-for walking along with his mouth open-for
spending too much time polishing his ROTC uniform."' °3 Jus-
tice Rose lists these things in an attempt to elicit a response of
shock and horror from the reader and to emphasize that such
brutality is surely outside the realm of common experience. Jus-
tice Rose relies on this horror to substantiate his claims that a
jury cannot fairly evaluate an abused defendant based upon
traditional notions of self-defense defined in terms of the "rea-
sonable person." A jury of individuals who are shocked by such
physical abuse is less competent to judge the reasonableness of
the actions of one who has spent his or her life enduring that
abuse than individuals who are familiar with the effects of abuse.
The dissent urges that because the abused person is in a constant
state of "imminent danger," members of the jury cannot compre-
hend "how abused people reasonably handle their fears and anx-
ieties. " 1°4 Justice Rose explains that the unusual behavioral
circumstances cause abuse cases to be
cloaked in the abstract mysteries of professional knowl-
edge, [so that] the jury, deprived of an expert's explana-
tion of how battered people perceive and respond to
imminence of danger, could not be expected to and did
not understand and quantify the impact and residuals of
the years and years of battering ... the jury could, there-
fore, not know-or be expected to know-whether [the]
acts, at the time and place in question were, those of the
reasonable person similarly situated for whom the law of
self-defense provides comfort. 0 5
The dissent's willingness to expand the definition of reason-
able belief to encompass the mental state of a chronically abused
child living in constant fear of harm evidences its attempt to
afford to the abused individual the same fairness that the jury
system affords to all other accused persons. The dissent urged
that in
102. Id. at 1011.
103. Id. at 1026.
104. Id. at 1012.
105. Id.
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normal circumstances, these are the things that jurors can
fathom for themselves. However, when the beatings of
fourteen years have-or may have-caused the accused to
harbor types of fear, anxiety and apprehension with which
the nonbrutalized juror is unfamiliar and which result in
the taking of unusual defensive measures which, in the
ordinary circumstances, might be thought about as prema-
ture, excessive or lacking in escape efforts by those who are
uninformed about the fear and anxiety that permeate the
world of the brutalized-then expert testimony is neces-
sary to explain the battered-person syndrome and the way
these people respond.1"6
The dissent would admit testimony of abuse and expert testi-
mony explaining the effects of that abuse because its admission is
"central to the viability of [the defendant's] plea of self-
defense."10 7 The dissent did not propose a change in the lan-
guage of the standard self-defense instruction, rather it suggested
that the language of the existing instruction would include some
battered children who kill abusive parents if expert testimony
regarding reasonableness is admitted. The dissent explained
that testimony regarding the defendant's abuse and its effects is
necessary because that testimony might answer
the question which asks whether [the abused], at the time
and place when he shot and killed his father, reasonably
believed it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent
imminent danger or great bodily harm to himself and his
sister. It is also necessary to recount the beating testimony
for the purpose of evaluating the necessity and admissibil-
ity of expert psychiatric testimony to show whether the
mental and physical mistreatment [the abused] suffered
made it reasonable for him - under all relevant circum-
stances - to behave as he did.
10 8
By informing the jury of the mental condition of the abused
child, the dissent would narrow the gap in experience between
the jury members and the abused in an attempt to ensure the
accused a fair trial based in common knowledge, if not common
experience.
106. Id. at 1018.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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2. Jahnk. Critical Response
In her article, Abused Children Who Kill Abusive Parents, Susan
C. Smith argues that manslaughter is the appropriate legal
response to battered children who kill. Smith maintains that:
[V]oluntary manslaughter, rather than self-defense, is the
appropriate legal response to the killings [because] ... vol-
untary manslaughter recognizes both crimes in the context
in which they occur: categorizing the abuse as a mitigating
circumstance, while at the same time preserving the intent
of the self-defense doctrine by stressing the sanctity of
human life and discouraging self-help.
109
This approach accepts that no imminence exists when the bat-
tered child kills and thus evidence of abuse should serve only as a
mitigating factor used to reduce a murder charge to the lesser
offense of manslaughter.110 Smith concludes by pointing to the
case of Richard Jahnke as an appropriate response to an act of
parricide in a non-confrontational setting.
Smith's central premise is that evidence of abuse is better
suited to act as a mitigator than as proof of self-defense. The
Indiana Supreme Court noted that the "voluntary manslaughter
statute creates an affirmative defense of sudden heat akin to self-
defense. The latter is, if successful, a complete defense while the
defense of sudden heat is only a partial defense because it
reduces the seriousness of the crime from the murder felony to a
class B felony."11' A representative manslaughter statute pro-
vides: "A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another
human being while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary
manslaughter. The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating fac-
tor that reduces what otherwise would be murder.., to voluntary
manslaughter."112 Manslaughter is an inappropriate charge
against a battered child who kills an abusive parent in a non-con-
rontational setting for many of the same reasons that traditional
self-defense pleas are unavailable to them. Specifically, man-
slaughter statutes have implicit "reasonableness" and "immi-
nence" requirements built into the case law definition of
"sudden heat."
In Wollum v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court discussed the
role of the reasonableness requirement by explaining that "[f] or
109. Smith, supra note 11, at 160-61.
110. "By allowing testimony to place battered children within the purview
of the self-defense doctrine when no imminent harm is present, the goals of the
doctrine itself, society, and the criminal justice system are ill-served." Id. at 176.
111. Palmer v. State, 425 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ind. 1981).
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-3 (Bums 1994).
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a charge of murder to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter,
however, the defendant must have acted in reaction to a provoca-
tion which might have caused an ordinary person to act rashly, in
sudden passion, and without due deliberation."1 13 The court
also discussed the imminence requirement of the manslaughter
statute which requires close temporal proximity between the
advent of the defendant's ire and the actual killing." 4 There-
fore, the battered child who kills in a non-confrontational setting
will encounter the same, if not greater, obstacles in trying to fit
within the framework of manslaughter that he or she encounters
in claiming self-defense.
C. Change: Janes - Accepting Battered Children's Syndrome as a
Defense
1. The Case
In State v. Janes,"5 sixteen-year-old AndrewJanes announced
his intention to shoot his stepfather Walter Jaloveckas several
hours before the killing actually occurred. Andrew smoked mari-
juana and drank alcohol in the hours before he shot his stepfa-
ther twice in the head as he entered the family home. On the
basis of these facts and no more, it is not difficult to understand
why ajury convicted Andrew of second degree murder. But, it is
important to note that the trial court refused to admit evidence
regarding Andrew's past abuse at the hands of his stepfather, rul-
ing that "in the absence of evidence showing that Andy was in
fact in imminent danger at the time of the shooting, there was an
insufficient factual basis to support giving an instruction regard-
ing self-defense."" 6
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals opted for a
different approach. The Court of Appeals held that a "defendant
is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury
under appropriate instructions when the theory is supported by
sufficient evidence."" 7 The court continued by setting a very low
threshold for "sufficient evidence" stating that "self-defense is
113. 380 N.E.2d 82, 87 (Ind. 1978) (emphasis added).
114. In Weaver v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction because the defendant
killed the victim one day after overhearing the victim's plan to murder the
defendant's brother. The court refused to give the instruction because the
evidence could not show that the defendant was acting in sudden heat. 583
N.E.2d 136, 142 (Ind. 1991).
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properly raised if the defendant produces 'any evidence' tending
to show self-defense." 1 " The most important aspect of the
court's decision was in its interpretation of the imminence prong
of the Washington State self-defense statute. 1 9 The court con-
cluded that "while the 'imminent danger' prong requires the
jury to find that the victim honestly and reasonably believed that
the aggressor intended to inflict serious bodily injury in the near
future, there need be no evidence of an actual physical assault to
demonstrate the immediacy of danger.""' Instead, the court
ruled that only, "[s]ome evidence of aggressive or threatening
behavior, gestures, or communication by the victim is typically
required to show that the defendant's belief that he or she was in
imminent danger of great bodily harm was reasonable." 1 ' This
interpretation of imminence hallmarks an unprecedented break
from traditional self-defense thinking.
By allowing the jury to consider all of the evidence which
could have affected the actor's perceptions at the time of the kill-
ing and by employing only a subjective standard to evaluate
imminence,122 the court acknowledged the validity of Battered
Child Syndrome as equal to that of the Battered Woman Syn-
drome. In deciding whether or not evidence of Battered Child
Syndrome is admissible, the appellate court instructed the trial
court to use the same two-part test it uses in cases of Battered
Woman Syndrome. First, it must ask, "(1) whether scientific
understanding of the battered child syndrome is sufficiently
developed so as to be generally admissible, and (2) whether the
expert testimony offered would have been helpful to the trier of
fact in the context of this case."1 21 In answering these questions,
the court admitted that although, "no Washington case has yet
recognized the 'battered child syndrome' in this context, the per-
tinent literature indicates that there is a sufficient scientific basis
to justify extending the battered woman syndrome to analogous
situations affecting children."
24
After deciding that Battered Child Syndrome passed the test
for admissibility in Janes, the court reversed the conviction and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its rulings. In
doing so, the court pointed out that because "children are both
objectively and subjectively more vulnerable to the effects of vio-
118. Id. (quoting State v. Adams, 641 P.2d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)).
119. See WASH. CraM. CODE § 9A.16.050 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
120. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1241.
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lence than are adults... the rationale underlying the admissibil-
ity of testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome is at
least as compelling, if not more so, when applied to children."
12 5
In this one opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals gave a
voice to children that had been silenced not only in their homes
but also in the courtrooms.
2. Janes. Critical Response
Two of the commentators cited by the Court of Appeals in
its Janes opinion are JoElle Anne Moreno and Paul A. Mones.
Moreno analyzes Battered Child Syndrome in her Article, Killing
Daddy 26 by comparing it to the analogous Battered Woman Syn-
drome. She begins by arguing that "the perceptions and
responses of a battered person can be understood only within
the context of her unique situation." 27 In examining the tradi-
tional constraints of self-defense theories, she concludes that
they work to the exclusion of the battered child primarily
because they are premised upon "male, stranger-to-stranger
assault"' 28 and therefore fail to "account for familiarity and
heightened awareness."' 29 In her conclusion, Moreno calls for
the type ofjudicial recognition of the shortcomings of traditional
self-defense that occurred in Janes.
Paul A. Mones, a defense attorney who specializes in repre-
senting children who kill their parents, argues for a Battered
Child Syndrome defense in a slightly different manner in his
book, When a Child Kills. 3 ° In contrast to Moreno who argues for
a Battered Child Syndrome defense by comparison to Battered
Woman Syndrome, Mones explains the syndrome by illuminat-
ing the uniqueness of the abused child. Mones asserts from his
experience as a juvenile advocate that abused children experi-
ence the same natural inclination as nonabused children to
remain attached to the parent despite the battering incident.''
In order to escape, the battered child must not only overcome
this natural inclination but also must get someone to believe the
story, prove the abuse, and leave the situation. For adults, these
are often difficult tasks; for children, they can be all but impossi-
ble. Mones explains that:
125. Id. at 1243.
126. Moreno, supra note 72, at 1290.
127. Id. at 1290.
128. Id. at 1285.
129. Id. at 1286.
130. MoNas, supra note 6.
131. Id. at 37.
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Going against the parent is difficult for even a normal,
well-adjusted child. When the vow of silence is reinforced
by threats ... it becomes virtually impossible for the child
to risk speaking out. Even assuming the child has the Her-
culean strength to overcome these barriers, there is a very
real possibility that no one will believe his story. All chil-
dren learn early that the words of adults carry far more
weight than their own.132
Given the unique situation of the battered child, Mones
posits that although "murdering a parent is not an acceptable
solution to child abuse; it is a solution forced upon the child" so
that "victims of child abuse are entitled to'do anything necessary
to free themselves from their tyranny.""3 ' Mones ruins his case
by this wildly overblown rhetoric.
While Mones believes that victims of child abuse are entitled
to do anything to escape, the law cannot tolerate vigilante mur-
der. Yet because child abuse, the severity of which may suggest
to a child that murder is the only means of escape, is a reality
which continues to exist, the law cannot continue to ignore the
plight of those who are subjected to it. Simply because battered
children were not adequately considered when traditional self-
defense theory was formulated does not mean that they should
be forever excluded from it. The solution to these two irreconcil-
able approaches to an adequate defense for battered children
who kill lies in a compromise between the two extremes of denial
of a self-defense instruction to a battered child and free reign to
the victim of abuse who kills. This compromise must be sought
through the continued expansion of the foundations which have
already been laid.
VI. FOUNDATIONS FOR EXPANSION AND ACCEPTANCE
The shortcomings of traditional self-defense as applied to
victims of domestic abuse has been noted and addressed in the
analogous situation of the battered wife. At present, a majority of
states allow evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS)
either to mitigate a murder charge to manslaughter or to act as a
full affirmative defense,1 34 but only one state has allowed similar
evidence of Battered Child Syndrome to act as a full affirmative
132. Id.
.133. Id. at 392.
134. James 0. Pearson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Opinion
Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R. 4th 1153 (1982 &
Supp. 1994).
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defense.1 3 5 Other states have responded by enacting specific leg-
islation to deal with admission of evidence of Battered Child Syn-
drome in the self-defense context.
3 6
A. Battered Woman Syndrome - Recognition and Acceptance
In 1977, Dr. Lenore Walker was the first person successfully
to present expert testimony on the symptoms and effects of Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome as a defense to homicide. 137 Walker,
the leading expert on the subject of Battered Woman Syndrome,
explains the battering situation as a "Cycle of Violence" which is
comprised of three phases: the tension building phase; the acute
battering incident; and the tranquil/loving phase. 138 During the
tension-building phase, "[a]ny unexpected circumstance that
arises may catalyze a sudden escalation of violence, an explo-
sion."139 In order to ward off a major explosion, the woman sub-
mits to lesser forms of abuse such as verbal insults and slaps, yet
"the effect it has on exacerbating her already-established psycho-
logical terror cannot be stressed enough." 40 During the acute
battering phase, the violence escalates to uncontrollable rage
and brutality. During this violent phase, the woman may feel
detached and "psychologically trapped." 41 Walker explains that
the woman does not leave or attempt escape because "her bat-
terer is in nearly all cases much stronger than her physically, and
she knows from past experience that it is futile to fight him."1"2
It is during the final tranquil phase that "the battered woman is
most thoroughly victimized psychologically."1 43 Walker suggests
that the tranquil phase is the most victimizing because the bat-
terer and his victim become dependent on one another - he for
her forgiveness and she for his caring behavior. Walker argues
that "underneath the grim cycle of tension, violence, and forgive-
135. In State v. Janes, the Washington Court of Appeals became the first
court in the United States to allow Battered Child Syndrome to act as a full
affirmative defense. See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
136. The Texas legislature recently enacted a statute which allows the
defendant to present evidence of past familial violence if the defendant is
pursuing a self-defense instruction. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West
Supp. 1993). I discuss this statute in Section V, B infra note 154. See also Aiuz.
STAT. ANN. § 13-415 (West Supp. 1995); Ky. STAT. ANN. § 503.010(3) (Baldwin
Supp. 1992).
137. WALKER, supra note 6, at 303-04.
138. Id. at 42.
139. Id. at 43.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 44.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 45.
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ness that makes their love truly terrifying, each partner may
believe that death is preferable to separation. "144
Going through this "cycle of violence," the individual learns
helplessness. The effect of learned helplessness is that
"[b] attered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation,
even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible,
because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that
nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circum-
stances."14 5 Once in the cycle of "learned helplessness," " a
person:
[W]ill be more likely to respond to that situation with cop-
ing responses rather than by trying to escape.., the truth
of facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the
individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the
situation.
With regard to traditional definitions of imminence and rea-
sonableness, it is important to understand, Walker says, that bat-
tered women come to know the subtleties of the abuser's actions
and tones of voice and come to identify those nuances with an
impending beating. "Their interpretation of the emotions
expressed by his nonverbal body language provide as much
important information as does his verbal message. Women also
use their prior knowledge or history of a situation in order to
assign meaning to an event."
147
Because the woman knows that a battering incident may
soon be visited upon her because of a familiar look, tone, or
other nonverbal action, her response to a seemingly harmless
nonverbal action may seem wholly unreasonable to an unin-
formed jury. If the jury has no context in which to place the act,
it cannot properly judge the woman's act as reasonable or unrea-
sonable. The above factors constitute much of the reason that a
majority of states have accepted evidence of Battered Woman
Syndrome in criminal trials.
In State v. Kelly, the New Jersey Supreme Court enumerated
the reasons which justified the court's acceptance of Battered
Woman Syndrome as an affirmative defense stating that it had:
gained general acceptance as a scientific doctrine within
the professional community [and] public policy considera-
tions complement these traditional modes for determining
whether a particular subject matter is reliable and within
144. Id.
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the purview of expert knowledge. An emerging public pol-
icy acknowledges the battered women's syndrome. Psychi-
atrists, psychologists, and social scientists, as well as the
legal and law enforcement community, have begun to
come to grips with the forces that generate and perpetuate
familial and domestic violence.
148
Can it be rationally argued that battered children do not fit into
this framework as much as battered women? In fact, the Janes
court observed that because "children are both objectively and
subjectively more vulnerable to the effects of violence than are
adults .... the rationale underlying the admissibility of testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome is at least as compel-
ling, if not more so, when applied to children."
1 49
Other reasons cited for the battered woman's inability to
escape the battering situation include the fact that the woman
may have sought outside help, but was frustrated by the police's
or community's inadequate response to the situation. The
woman may have "tried to leave but was forced to stay ... may
have been physically barred from leaving or physically forced to
return... the woman may have been economically dependent
on the batterer, or may have had no family or friends in the area
to which to turn for help." 5 0 All of these reasons lend validity to
the claim of Battered Woman Syndrome that the failure of
outside forces to intervene help create the belief that the woman
is truly trapped and that, in order to escape the violence, she
must also resort to violence. These reasons apply as much, and
indeed more, to the battered child. Most children do not have
the financial or psychological maturity to leave home, nor do
they know of the resources available to help them. Even if a
child does seek help, his or her pleas will often go unheard.5
Likewise, children are especially suspectable to economic and
familial dependence given their young age and limited options.
There is no legitimate reason for thejudiciary's slow accept-
ance of Battered Child Syndrome when compared to Battered
Woman Syndrome. In State v. Janes, the court admitted as much
when it pointed out "the Battered Women's Syndrome and the
Battered Child Syndrome constitute a single psychological disor-
der for purposes of expert testimony . . . . The differences
148. Id. at 256.
149. 478 A.2d 364, 388 (N.J. 1984).
150. State v.Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 850
P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993).
151. David L. Faigman, Discerning Justice Wen Battered Women Kil, 39
HAsT. L.J. 207, 211 (1987).
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between the groups are negligible."152 The Janes court went fur-
ther to note that children may present an even more compelling
argument for application of the doctrine in that "children are
both objectively and subjectively more vulnerable to the effects of
violence than are adults."15 Children
have virtually no independent ability to support them-
selves, thus preventing them from escaping the abusive
atmosphere. Further, unlike an adult who may come into
a battering relationship with at least some basis on which
to make comparisons between current and past exper-
iences, a child has no such equivalent life experience on
which to draw to put the battering into perspective. There
is therefore every reason to believe that a child's entire
world view and sense of self may be conditioned by reac-
tion to that abuse.
1 5 4
The reality remains that given the seeming judicial acceptance of
the psychological and legal validity of Battered Woman Syn-
drome, there are few, if any, defensible reasons not to extend
similar consideration to the battered child.
B. Legislatively Enacted Proposals for Reform
In 1993, the Texas legislature adopted a criminal statute
which allowed broad admissibility of evidence regarding domes-
tic violence in prosecutions for criminal homicide. Texas Penal
Code section 19.06 provides:
(a) In all prosecutions for murder or voluntary manslaugh-
ter, the state or the defendant shall be permitted to offer
testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the killing and the previous relationship existing
between the accused and the deceased, together with all
relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condi-
tion of the mind of the accused at the time of the
offense.
1 55
The statute further provides that if a defendant raises self-
defense as a justification that he or she is entitled to offer:
(1) relevant evidence that the defendant had been the vic-
tim of acts of family violence committed by the deceased
... and (2) relevant expert testimony regarding the condi-
152. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 98
(1991).
153. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1240.
154. Id. at 1243.
155. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West Supp. 1993).
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tion of the mind of the defendant at the time of the
offense, including those relevant facts and circumstances
relating to family violence that are the basis of the expert's
testimony. m6
Apparently, only one case was decided under section 19.06.
The case involved seventeen-year-old Donna Weisner who used
the statute to give testimony that her father had beaten her into
unconsciousness, thrown logs at her and handcuffed her to a
chair.1 5 7 Donna shot her father six times after he "had his hands
out and he looked like he was going to choke [her].""' Donna
was subsequently acquitted of the murder charge. What is excep-
tionally noteworthy about this case is that no expert testimony
was presented, Donna simply told the jury about the past abuse.
Although the Texas legislature deleted section 19.06 from its
penal code after the Weisner decision,15 9 the same language has
been reenacted in Article 38.36 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. 
1 60
VII. SENTENCING - FURTHER EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL CONFUSION
& ANOTHER REASON FOR CHANGE
Courts have approached the difficult task of sentencing the
battered child who kills against the backdrop of traditional goals
of punishment. Competing concerns about whether treatment
and rehabilitation or retribution and deterrence should be
emphasized have caused courts to hand out widely disparate
sentences to parricide offenders.
In 1982, Richard Jahnke shot and killed his father for which
he was later convicted of voluntary manslaughter.' 6' Two weeks
later in northern Florida, seventeen-year-old George Bums, Jr.
shot his father six times in the back. At trial, it was revealed that
both youths were victims of years of mental and physical abuse at
the hands of their fathers and both were convicted of their
crimes. The divergence in their stories occurs at the sentencing
stage.
In 1983, George Bums, Jr. was given fifteen years probation
and released while Richard Jahnke was sentenced to five to fif-
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Michael K. Molitor, The "Battered Child Syndromew " as Self-Defense
Evidence in Parricide Cases: Recent Developments and A Possible Approach, 40 WAYNE
L. REv. 237, 250 (1993).
159. Id. at 251 n.83.
160. 19.06 deleted by Acts 1993, 73d. Leg., ch. 900, 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
161. TEX. CODE Cram. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (West Supp. 1995).
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teen years in prison. The words of the sentencing judges are
illustrative of the competing concerns of the judiciary in sentenc-
ing parricide offenders. Circuit Judge L. Page Haddock told
Burns that "I do not want you to think in any way that what you
have done has been condoned by society. [But] I believe that the
chain of violence and abuse that led you to this end were
brought about by your father's actions rather than by yours."162
In striking contrast, DistrictJudge Paul Liamos advised, "I'm sure
we all have compassion for Richard Jahnke. [But] regardless of
the circumstances ... no one should be permitted to act a prose-
cutor, jury, judge, court of appeal and executioner without being
called upon to account to society. "163
Another case which illustrates this frustration is that ofJoeri
DeBeer who was convicted of manslaughter after he killed his
abusive legal guardian. Joeri was sentenced to three years proba-
tion after the sentencing judge explained "he felt confident that
DeBeer knew the killing was wrong and would not pose a danger
to society."1" If parricides committed by abused children were
typical homicides, there would not be this great disparity in sen-
tencing. The fact that one teenager can be sentenced to years in
prison while another is given only probation attests to the fact
that judges are finding ways to work around the present state of
self-defense law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Traditional theories of self-defense presume two strangers,
one who is attacking and another who is responding to the
attack. While the majority of homicides committed in self-
defense do fall into this framework, there exists an entire class of
homicides committed by the victims of domestic violence who
fall outside of it. Lawmakers did not so much rationally choose
to exclude this group of individuals from the framework as they
did not acknowledge their existence at the time of the law's for-
mation. A combination of social and historical factors have com-
bined to hide the severity and commonness of child abuse for
decades. Now, as the mask of child abuse is being slowly disman-
fled by agencies and advocates designed to thwart it, the frighten-
ing realities which pervade the lives of many of America's
children have been revealed.
162. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
163. Barry Siegel, When Tortured Children Strike Back, 7 UPDATE ON LAW-
RELATED EDUC., at 8 (Fall 1983).
164. Id.
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The current challenge confronting the criminal justice sys-
tem is to deal properly with these realities when the battered
child enters the criminal justice system as the accused rather
than the victim. Science has recognized the validity of Battered
Child Syndrome and its effects. Given this general recognition
by the scientific community, the legal community must do its
part to acknowledge this group. In remaining true to its task, the
law must seek to judge fairly those who come within its rule. The
question currently confronting the legislatures and the courts is
what is the most appropriate and just legal response to battered
children who kill.
Critics contend that acceptance of Battered Child Syndrome
as evidence of self-defense represents an "abdication of responsi-
bility by individuals, families, groups, and even nations." 65 But
this inquiry presumes its answer. That is, critics presume the
question to be "Is this defendant a member of a group (here,
battered children) such that inclusion in the group excuses the
actor from punishment?" In reality, inclusion in the particular
group does not excuse the actor, it simply makes available to the
jury the needed information and fair standards by which to judge
his or her acts. Thus, the question is "Is this defendant a mem-
ber of a group (battered children) such that his or her actions
must be evaluated in light of relevant expert testimony?" In this
way, safeguards are still in place to guide the jury's decision. 66
The admission of evidence of a history of abuse as well as
expert testimony explaining the effects of that abuse is essential
to a fair trial for the abused child who kills. The admission of
such testimony does not ensure the battered child an acquittal as
there is no reason to believe that juries will abandon their gen-
eral horror and disdain of homicide. Rather, the testimony is
admitted so that the jury can accurately measure the actor's cul-
pability in the particular circumstances. Without this testimony,
the jury cannot adequately decide whether an action was reason-
able or unreasonable. Similarly, without knowing the history of
abuse which led to the killing, the jury cannot fairly assess the
imminence of the harm. Given that these two terms are essential
to the successful employment of any self-defense argument,
courts should allow the evidence in and trust juries to follow the
instructions given to them.
165. DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 5, at 4.
166. JoElle Moreno points out that "[a]llowing these defendants to
develop their claim of self-defense merely affirms their right to fair legal
treatment. It does not grant them additional privileges, nor does it, or can it,
compensate them for what they have already lost." Moreno, supra note 72, at
1307.
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Because there is the danger that a jury may choose to focus
more on the testimony of abuse rather than on the killing, the
rules governing admission of testimony must be narrowly tailored
so that evidence of abuse is properly used by the jury. The jury
should always remember that it is considering the homicide com-
mitted by the child and not the past sins of the abusive parent.
Legislative proposals such as the statute enacted in Texas go
a long way in achieving this goal. By allowing evidence of domes-
tic abuse in homicide prosecutions, this statute provides the jury
with the information that it needs to assess properly the state of
mind of the actor at the time of the killing. Both the Texas and
the California legislatures have made strides towards providing a
fair trial to a child who kills in response to abuse at the hands of
a parent. Texas stops short of recognizing the validity of Bat-
tered Child Syndrome while California refuses to extend its codi-
fication of Battered Woman's Syndrome to include the battered
child. Similarly, while the Washington Supreme Court recog-
nized the validity of Battered Child Syndrome in Janes, the legis-
lature has not enacted a bill which codifies the views expressed in
that opinion. Accordingly, this Note finds its conclusion in the
following proposed statute:
(a) In all prosecutions for murder where the defendant
was a juvenile at the time the crime was committed, the
state or the defendant shall be allowed to offer testimony
as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the
killing and the previous relationship existing between the
accused and the deceased.
(b) If the defendant raises a self-defense justification, the
defendant shall be permitted to offer:
(1) relevant evidence that the defendant had been the
victim of family abuse at the hands of the deceased;
and
(2) relevant expert testimony regarding the defend-
ant's state of mind at the time of the killing, including
the relevant facts and circumstances of family violence
that are the basis of the expert's opinion.
(a) The foundation shall be sufficient for admis-
sion of this expert testimony if the party seeking
to introduce the evidence establishes its relevancy
and the proper qualifications of the expert wit-
ness. Expert opinion testimony on battered child
syndrome shall not be considered a new scientific
technique whose reliability is unproven.
(b) This expert testimony may include the physi-
cal, emotional, or mental effects of abuse upon
1996]
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the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of
child abuse.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "juvenile" is
defined as any person under eighteen (18) years
of age.
(d) For purposes of this section, "abuse" is
defined as intentionally or recklessly causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury, or sexual
assault, or to place a person in reasonable appre-
hension of imminent serious bodily harm or
death.
(e) For purposes of this section, "family abuse" is
abuse perpetrated against the juvenile by a par-
ent, guardian or other primary caregiver.
167
In cases where sufficient evidence of Battered Child Syn-
drome has been admitted, the trial court should, in appropriate
cases instruct the jury on self-defense. A possible self-defense
instruction would provide:
Where the Battered Child Syndrome is an issue in this
case, the standard for reasonableness concerning an
accused's belief in asserting self-defense is not an objective,
but a subjective standard. You must determine, from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person with the defendant's his-
tory, whether defendant's belief in the need to defend
himself or herself was reasonable.
Where the Battered Child Syndrome is an issue in this
case, the standard for reasonableness concerning an
accused's belief in imminent danger of serious bodily
harm or death is both objective and subjective. You must
determine, from the viewpoint of a reasonable person with
the defendant's history, whether defendant's belief in
imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death was
reasonable.
The evidentiary standard and the jury instruction proposed
above should not be implemented in cases where the child had
an opportunity to leave the abusive environment nor where there
is insufficient evidence of serious abuse at the hands of the vic-
tim. This proposed evidentiary standard and jury instruction are
not meant to dismantle traditional self-defense so that battered
children may exact their own brand of fatalistic revenge upon
parents who have abused them. The proposals are instead
167. Adapted from TEX. CODE CGUM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (West Supp.
1995) and CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. § 1107 (Deering 1995).
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offered in an attempt to allow juries to hear and understand all
of the relevant evidence and testimony necessary to bring about a
just result. If implemented correctly, these proposals will not
promote injustice by undermining the validity of the self-defense
argument, but instead will bring about justice where there was
none before.

